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The dilemma of research in cybersecurity
management
What does cybersecurity have to do with ‘A Beautiful
Mind’?
I have recently attended one of the most eminent management
conferences in the world. In these international events, thousands of
academics, professionals, experts and curious people gather to share
their current research, illustrate their latest advancements, spread their
cutting-edge ideas or simply look for connections and some good food
in an interesting new city. I played my part in the conference’s
industrious beehive and I presented a paper of mine. But really, I wasn’t
there for that. I was looking to gain some insights on my current focus
area, the management of cybersecurity in modern organisations.
Let’s get this straight: Information Security (IS) is “The protection of
information and information systems from unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, disruption, modi cation, or destruction in order to provide
con dentiality, integrity, and availability.” Cybersecurity (CS) is “The
ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyber attacks.”
(NIST, 2013, p. 94 and p. 58). Practically speaking, the former also
includes physical information security threats (e.g. an outsider
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physically intruding an organisation to steal data), while the latter
focuses on threats to, and from, the cyberspace. Now that the house is
in order, back to my conference.
Around 3,500 academic papers were presented at the conference. The
overall quality was very good, with interesting, solid pieces of
management research showcased. Now, how many of those papers
were on CS? One hundred? Fifty?
Two. 2. About 0.06%.
Although not providing a de nitive conclusion on the interest, mass
and quality of current research in CS, this number seems to strengthen
a matter of fact: there is not enough research in CS management. Let’s
try to unpack this.
A matter of perspective?
Why a global management conference does not host a relevant quantity
of research in CS? I have two connected answers to this:
A: CS does not belong to management. So what does it belong to?
B: There is simply not enough research on CS management.
Let’s sort out the  rst one, by looking at the four perspectives under
which CS is mainly considered in current research.
Typically, CS is investigated by researchers in information
systems because it is traditionally thought to be a technical issue.
Did you get hacked? Well, probably your company didn’t have the
right  rewalls in place. Or your Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
didn’t pick up the latest malware that hit your network. The
technical aspects of CS mainly refer to understanding the technical
dynamics of cyber-threats and designing appropriate mitigation
tools (for example cryptography and Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition).
CS is also quite well explored from a legal perspective, focusing
on the concept of cyber-crime and exploring its implications in
terms of both o enders’ behaviours and repercussions on victims.
Cyber-crime (which clearly di ers from CS, as it has been
brilliantly pointed out in this article) is mainly investigated
utilising methodological tools from psychology, criminology and
sociology.
1.
2.
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Associated with the previous, behavioral sciences are
investigating what factors drive people’s decisions when they face
potential cyber-threats (for instance, spear phishing). These
studies operate a sort of reverse social engineering and unpack the
reasons why, based on phenomena such as, for example, channel
factors and habituation, employees may systematically ignore
software update warnings or download potentially malicious
email attachments (check this short story out to know more about
this).
Finally, in the current, post-Cold War, international environment,
characterised by highly asymmetric distribution of power, another
nuance of CS that is attracting increasing attention is the concept
of cyber-warfare. This relatively new perspective, explored in the
international relations domain, aims at understanding how
international security can move to a digital environment and play
its ‘balance of power’ with completely digitised weapons.
And CS management? Well, there is not much in this space. Yet, a
plethora of elements naturally create a raison d’etre for exploring CS as
a managerial issue:
The importance of human factors in CS;
The long-term, strategic impact on the business that cyber-attacks
can have (for example, in terms of reputation);
The need for companies to get their cyber-crisis communication
right (Uber provided the latest example);
The budget limitations that some companies impose on CS,
sometimes considered another entry in the risk register.
The table below provides an illustration of the aforementioned CS
disciplines, with sample research questions and focus areas.
3.
4.
•
•
•
•
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So, we were saying ‘there’s not enough research in CS management’. Why
is this the case? We have outlined a couple of reasons so far, but let’s
now face another one: organisations do not like to share information
about what they may not have done properly. And research in
management is mainly about talking to companies and unpacking what
they do. In my recent research, I have experienced instances in which
questions about cyber-risks have raised barriers around commercial in
con dence information.
Sharing is (not) caring: A cyber-prisoners’ dilemma
The reason why companies generally don’t want to share information
about their CS (in the form of threat intelligence, best practices, track
records of security breaches, etc.) relates to the previously mentioned
reputational impact that companies fear so much. One of the resulting
issues is that research struggles to progress, especially in the  eld of
CS management, which largely depends on what organisations are
keen to share. This sounds like another information asymmetry issue
and, to further unpack ‘why companies don’t share’, I have applied some
‘game theory 1.0'.
Imagine an economy in which, for simplicity, only two companies exist
(A and B). These companies operate in the same market and are
constantly trying to steal each other’s customers. They are both very
digital and concerned about CS. In this economy, the overall progress
of research in CS depends on how much company A and B share about
CS: the breaches they had in the past, their defences, their mitigation
strategies, etc. The government is the champion of CS research, which
constitutes one of the forms of public good that the government intends
to pursue.
Cybersecurity disciplines with examples
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Now, imagine that both companies are attacked by a hacker who
manages to steal their customers’ personal details (identity, address,
password, etc.). Each company now faces a dilemma: do I share with the
world that I have been hacked or do I keep it for myself? The decision to
share has two impacts: on CS research and on customers.
First, when both companies share, the government obtains the highest
amount of CS information and CS research (as well as practice) is at its
best. When one company shares, while the other one doesn’t, the latter
increases its knowledge on CS (by learning something from the other
company), while the former’s knowledge remains unchanged (they
haven’t learnt anything they did not know).
Second, sharing in uences competition, as it alters the amount of
customers of a company. Customers would likely switch to the
competitor, if they knew that the company they have been loyal to has
been hacked and their data are compromised. As a result, when one
company shares and the other one doesn’t, the latter is likely to attract
some of the customers of the former. Conversely, when no company
shares, or both companies share, the change in customers’ balance is
null.
The  gure below illustrates this simple prisoners’ dilemma applied to CS
research, with an exemplar quanti cation of the gains and losses
obtained by each company in every situation. In terms of CS
knowledge, we hypothesise that sharing or not sharing produces either
‘0’ (the competitor doesn’t share) or ‘+5’ (the competitor shares) in
terms of CS knowledge. Negative values are not considered, as we
assume knowledge cannot be lost. In terms of customers, sharing or not
sharing produces ‘-7.5’ (the company shares, but the competitor
doesn’t, so customers from the former are captured by the latter), ‘0’
(both companies share or don’t share, with no impact on customers), or
‘+7.5’ (the company doesn’t share, but the competitor does, so
customers from the latter are captured by the former). Numbers are
arbitrary, but the gain or loss in terms of customers (+ or -7.5) is higher
than the gain or loss in terms of CS research (+ or - 5), to represent
how companies are generally more worried about their sales than their
CS. The sum of CS knowledge gained by the two companies determines
the impact on general CS research (0; +5; or +10), which, it is worth
repeating, is in the government’s utmost interest.
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This cyber-prisoners’ dilemma provides an illustration of the
con icting interests of private companies and the government (the
champion of the public good, CS research). The two companies have a
two-fold incentive in not disclosing information: they want to avoid
losing customers and they want to possibly capture some of the
competitors’ ones (top-right and bottom-left quadrants in the  gure
above) This dramatically clashes with the interests of the government,
which wants to avoid the bottom-right quadrant in the above matrix
and pushes towards the top-left (where the most CS research is
conducted). How can the government do so?
Australia’s Noti able Data Breaches Scheme
To facilitate collaboration in a naturally competitive environment, one
of the government’s sole weapons is to enforce it. Through compliance
mechanisms, public and private organisations are pushed to conform to
prescribed behaviours, or they risk hefty  nes.
Australia is experiencing similar dynamics in CS, with the Noti able
Data Breaches Scheme (NDB) entering into force on the 22nd February
2018. The NDB basically obliges some public and private organisations
to disclose instances of data breaches they su ered from. The NDB has
two main, direct objectives. First, as a mitigation strategy, it aims at
A cyber-prisoners’ dilemma
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improving the control that individuals have on their data, by allowing
them to act (e.g. ‘re-secure’ their online information) upon data
breaches. Second, as a deterrent strategy, it intends to push
organisations to strengthen their information security. The compliance
mechanism behind the NDB includes  nes up to $360,000 and $1.8
million for individuals and corporations, respectively, that fail to
conform. Together with achieving its two primary goals, the NDB can
facilitate CS research, raise consumers’ awareness around CS
issues, and increase organisational accountability and
transparency.
Even before entering into force, the NDB has attracted signi cant
debate in the CS community. I will not address such debate here, but I
will try to sketch some of the implications that the Scheme could bring:
Given the stronger emphasis that the NDB will likely bring on the
reputational repercussions of CS, organisations will need to re-
think their CS as a potentially strategic component of their
business (e.g. as a competitive factor);
Involved organisations will need to address their cyber-crisis
communication capabilities and learn how to appropriately
communicate breaches they have been a ected by. Traditional
crisis management can provide some interesting lessons on this;
Smaller organisations, that don’t necessarily have su cient
resources, will need to explore collaborative options to face the
increasing impact that data breaches could potentially have on
their business. Collaborative platforms such as AusCERT and CS
start-ups can provide interesting solutions in this space.
When I speak to cyber-risk owners, the general perception I get is that
the NDB is a positive,  rst step towards a more solid CS legislation, for
Australia to ‘catch-up’ with countries (e.g. the US or the UK) that are
more ‘experienced’ in this space. From a research perspective, the
NDB can be a promising instrument towards more information
sharing. Good news for my current research, which is exploring some
of the aforementioned paradoxes of CS management, in order to
understand the extent to which CS will be an operational or a strategic
component of public and private organisations.
•
•
•
. . .
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At the PwC Chair in Digital Economy at QUT, we are conducting
research to understand the changing impact that cybersecurity will
have on public and private organisations. In particular, we are talking
to CIOs and CISOs to understand how strategic cybersecurity is likely to
become in the immediate future.
Read more from the PwC Chair in Digital Economy team.
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